Abstract Since the pioneering paper of Rosenthal a lot of work has been done in order to determine classes of games that admit a potential. First, we study the existence of potential functions for weighted congestion games. Let C be an arbitrary set of locally bounded functions and let G(C) be the set of weighted congestion games with cost functions in C. We show that every weighted congestion game G ∈ G(C) admits an exact potential if and only if C contains only affine functions. We also give a similar characterization for w-potentials with the difference that here C consists either of affine functions or of certain exponential functions. We finally extend our characterizations to weighted congestion games with facility-dependent demands and elastic demands, respectively.
Introduction
In many situations, the state of a system is determined by a large number of independent agents, each pursuing selfish goals optimizing an individual objective function.
A natural framework for analyzing such decentralized systems are noncooperative games. It is well known that an equilibrium point in pure strategies (if it exists) need not optimize the social welfare as individual incentives are not always compatible with social objectives. Fundamental goals in algorithmic game theory are to decide whether a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (PNE for short) exists, how efficient it is in the worst case, and how fast an algorithm (or protocol) converges to an equilibrium.
One of the most successful approaches in accomplishing these goals is the potential function approach initiated by Rosenthal [28] and generalized by Monderer and Shapley in [25] : one defines a function P on the set of possible strategies of the game and shows that every strictly improving move by one defecting player strictly reduces (increases) the value of P . If the set of outcomes of such a game is finite, every sequence of improving moves converges to a PNE. In particular, the global minimum (maximum) of P is a PNE.
A function P with the property above is called a potential function of the game. If one can associate a weight w i to each player such that w i P decreases about the same value as the private cost of the defecting player i, then P is called a w-potential. If, in addition, w i = 1 for each player, then P is called an exact potential.
Framework
An important class of games studied in the game theory, operations research, computer science and economics literature is the class of congestion games. This class of games has several concrete applications such as scheduling games, routing games, facility location games, and network design games, see [1, 3, 7, 16, 19, 24] . Congestion games, as introduced by Rosenthal [28] , model the interaction of a finite set of strategic agents that compete over a finite set of facilities. A pure strategy of each player is a set of facilities. We consider cost minimization games. Here, the cost of facility f is given by a real-valued cost function c f that depends on the number of players using f and the private cost of every player equals the sum of the costs of the facilities in the strategy that she chooses. 1 Rosenthal [28] proved in a seminal paper that such congestion games always admit a PNE by showing these games posses an exact potential function.
In a weighted congestion game, every player has a demand d i ∈ R >0 that she places on the chosen facilities. The cost of a facility is a function of the total demand of the facility. In contrast to unweighted congestion games, weighted congestion games, even with two players, do not always admit a PNE, see the examples given by Fotakis et al. [14] , Goemans et al. [17] , and Libman and Orda [21] . It is worth noting that the instance in [14] only relies on cost functions that are either linear or maxima of two linear functions. The instance in [17] only uses polynomial cost functions with nonnegative coefficients and degree of at most two.
On the positive side, Fotakis et al. [14, 15] proved that every weighted congestion game with affine cost functions possesses an exact potential function and thus, a PNE. Panagopoulou and Spirakis [27] proved existence of a weighted potential function for the case that all costs are determined by the exponential function. The results of [14, 15] and [27] are particularly appealing as they establish existence of a potential function independent of the underlying game structure, that is, independent of the underlying strategy set, demand vector, and number of players, respectively. To further stress this independence property, we rephrase the result of Fotakis et al. as follows: Let C be a set of affine cost functions and let G(C) be the set of all weighted congestion games with cost functions in C. Then, every game in G(C) possesses an exact potential.
A natural open question is to decide whether there are further functions guaranteeing the existence of an exact or weighted potential. We thus investigate the following question: How large is the class C of (continuous) cost functions such that every game in the set of weighted congestion games G(C) with cost functions in C does admit a potential function and hence a PNE?
Before we outline our results we present related work and explain, why it is important to characterize weighted congestion games admitting a potential function.
Related Work
Fundamental issues in algorithmic game theory are the computability of Nash equilibria and the design of distributed dynamics (for instance best-response) that provably converge in reasonable time to a Nash equilibrium (in pure or mixed strategies).
Monderer and Shapley [25] formalized Rosenthal's approach of using potential functions to determine the existence of PNE. Furthermore, they show that one-side better response dynamics, i.e., sequences of unilateral deviations strictly reducing the deviating player's private costs, always converge to a PNE provided the game is finite and admits a potential. In addition, they proved that w-potential games have other desirable properties, e.g., the Fictitious Play Process introduced by Brown [6] converges to a PNE [26] . For recent progress on convergence towards approximate Nash equilibria using potential functions, see Awerbuch et al. [4] and Fotakis et al. [12] .
Fabrikant et al. [11] proved that one can efficiently compute a PNE for symmetric network congestion games with nondecreasing cost functions. Their proof uses a potential function argument, similar to Rosenthal [28] . Fotakis et al. [14] proved that one can compute a PNE for weighted network games with affine cost (with nonnegative coefficients) in pseudo-polynomial time (again using a potential function).
Milchtaich [23] introduced weighted congestion games with player-specific cost functions. He presented, among other results, a game on 3 parallel links with 3 players, which does not possess a PNE. On the other hand, he proved that such games with 2 players do possess a PNE. Ackermann et al. [1] characterized conditions on the strategy space in weighted congestion games that guarantee the existence of PNE. They also considered the case of player-specific cost functions.
Gairing et al. [16] derive a potential function for the case of unweighted congestion games with player-specific linear latency functions (without a constant term). Mavronicolas et al. [22] prove that every unweighted congestion game with playerspecific (additive or multiplicative) constants on parallel links has an ordinal potential. Even-Dar et al. [10] consider a variety of load balancing games with makespan objectives and prove among other results that games on unrelated machines possess a generalized ordinal potential function. For related results, see the survey by Vöck-ing [29] and references therein.
Potential functions also play a central role in Shapley cost sharing games with weighted players, which are special cases of weighted congestion games, see Anshelevich et al. [3] and Albers et al. [2] . In the variant with weighted players, each player i has a demand d i that she wishes to place on each facility of an allowable subset of facilities (e.g., a path in a network connecting her source node s i to her terminal node t i ). When facility f ∈ F is stressed with a load of f (x) in strategy profile x, there exists a cost of k f ( f (x)). Under Shapley cost sharing, this cost is shared fairly with respect to the demands among the users. Thus the cost of player i for using facility f is defined as c i, (x) and clearly, the private cost of player i in strategy profile x is given as π i (x) = f ∈x i c i,f (x) . For the unweighted case (d i = 1, i ∈ N ), Anshelevich et al. [3] proved existence of PNE and derived bounds on the worst-case efficiency of Nash equilibria using a potential function argument. This argument fails in general for games with weighted players, see the counterexamples given by Chen and Roughgarden [7] . Determining subclasses of Shapley cost sharing games with weighted players that admit a potential, however, is an open problem that we address in this paper.
Our Results for Weighted Congestion Games
Our first two results provide a characterization of the existence of exact and wpotential functions for the set of weighted congestion games with locally bounded and continuous cost functions, respectively. Let C be an arbitrary set of locally bounded functions and let G(C) be the set of weighted congestion games with cost functions in C. We show that every weighted congestion game G ∈ G(C) admits an exact potential if and only if C contains only affine functions. Our proof relies on a seminal result of Monderer and Shapley [25] stating that a finite strategic game is an exact potential game if and only if the discrete integral over the player's utility functions along every 4-cycle is zero. We apply this 4-cycle condition for a generic weighted congestion game and obtain a functional equation in terms of the used cost functions and the used demands, respectively. By varying the demands we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition on the used cost functions expressed by a differential equation. Finally, we show that only affine functions fulfill this differential equation. We note that while the if-part of our characterization follows already from the potential function given by Fotakis et al. [14] , our complete characterization also delivers an alternative non-constructive proof for the if-part.
For an arbitrary set C of continuous functions, we show that every weighted congestion game G ∈ G(C) possesses a weighted potential if and only if exactly one of the following cases hold: (i) C contains only affine functions; (ii) C contains only exponential functions such that c( ) = a c e φ + b c for some a c , b c , φ ∈ R, where a c and b c may depend on c, while φ must be equal for every c ∈ C. To derive this result we use a scaling technique that transforms a w-potential game into an exact potential game. This allows us to apply the 4-cycle criterion of Monderer and Shapley on the transformed game which again gives rise to a functional equation. However, due to the degree of freedom of our scaling technique it is not possible to derive a differential equation. By discretizing the demands we can express the necessary and sufficient conditions on the cost functions as a recurrence relation for which we show that it is only satisfied by either affine or exponential only.
We additionally show that the above characterizations for exact and w-potentials are valid even if we restrict the set G(C) to two-player games (four-player games for w-potentials), three-facility games (four-facility games for w-potentials), games with symmetric strategies, games with singleton strategies, games with integral demands. Moreover, we derive a result for two-player weighted congestion games, showing that every such game with cost functions in C admits a weighted potential if C = {(c :
Our results have a series of consequences. First, using a result of Monderer and Shapley [25, Lemma 2.10], our characterization of w-potentials in weighted congestion games carries over to the mixed extension of weighted congestion games.
Second, we obtain the following characterizations for Shapley cost sharing games. Let K be a set of continuous functions. Then, the set S(K) of Shapley cost sharing games with weighted players and construction cost functions in K are w-potential games if and only if K contains either quadratic construction cost functions
where a k and b k may depend on k, while φ must be equal for every k ∈ K. Notice that these results hold for arbitrary coefficients a k , b k , φ ∈ R. Thus, we obtain the existence of PNE for a family of games with nondecreasing and strictly concave construction costs modeling the effect of economies of scale.
After the initial publication of this paper, Harks and Klimm [18] explored the existence of PNE in weighted congestion games. For a class C of twice continuously differentiable cost functions, they showed that the conditions given in Theorem 3.9 are in fact necessary for the existence of PNE in all weighted congestion games contained in G(C). Their characterization, however, requires new techniques based on the analysis of generic improvement cycles, see [18] for details.
Our Results for Extended Models
In the second part of this paper, we introduce two non-trivial extensions of weighted congestion games.
First, we study weighted congestion games with facility-dependent demands, that is, the demand d i,f of player i depends on the facility f . These games contain, among others, scheduling games on identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines. In contrast to classical load balancing games, we do not consider makespan objectives. In our model, the private cost of a player is a function of the machine load multiplied with the demand of the player.
We show the following: Let C be a set of continuous functions and let G f d (C) denote the set of weighted congestion games with facility-dependent demands and cost functions in C. Every G ∈ G f d (C) has a w-potential if and only if C contains only affine functions. In this case the w-potential is an exact potential. To the best of our knowledge, our characterization establishes for the first time the existence of an exact potential function (and hence the existence of a PNE) for affine cost functions and arbitrary strategy sets and demands, respectively. Second, we study weighted congestion games with elastic demands. Here, each player i is allowed to choose both a subset of the set of facilities and her demand d i out of a compact set D i ⊂ R >0 of demands that are allowable for her. This congestion model can be interpreted as a generalization of Cournot games [9] , where multiple producers strategically determine quantities they will produce. The cost of a producer is given by her offered quantity multiplied with the market price, which is usually a decreasing function of the total quantity offered by all producers. Weighted congestion games with elastic demands generalize Cournot games in the sense that there are multiple markets (facilities) and each player may offer her quantity on allowable subsets of these markets.
Weighted congestion games with elastic demands have several additional applications: they model, e.g., routing problems in the Internet, where each user wants to route data along a path in the network and adjusts the injected data rate according to the level of congestion in the network. Most mathematical models for routing and congestion control rely on fractional routing, see Kelly [20] and Cole et al. [8] . In practice, however, routing protocols use single path routing, see, e.g., the current TCP/IP protocol. Weighted congestion games with elastic demands model both congestion control and unsplittable routing. Yet another application is that of Shapley cost sharing games with players that may vary their requested demand.
Let G e (C) be the set of weighted congestion games with elastic demands where each player may chose her demand out of a compact space and where the cost of each facility is determined by a function in C. Here, our main contribution is to show that all games G ∈ G e (C) are w-potential games if and only if C contains only affine functions. For this important class of games, this result also establishes for the first time the existence of PNE.
Preliminaries
A finite strategic game is a tuple G = (N, X, π) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the nonempty finite set of players, X = × i∈N X i where X i is the finite and non-empty set of strategies of player i, and π : X → R n is the combined private cost function.
We will call an element x ∈ X strategy profile. For S ⊂ N , −S denotes the complementary set of S, and we define for convenience of notation X S = × j ∈S X j . Instead of X −{i} we will write X −i , and with a slight abuse of notation we will write sometimes a strategy profile as x = (x i , x −i ) meaning that x i ∈ X i and x −i ∈ X −i . A strategy profile x is a pure Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N the condition
A sufficient condition for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is the existence of a potential function, see Monderer and Shapley [25] . and a function P : 
The length of a closed path is defined as the number of its distinct elements. For a set of strategy profiles X let (X) denote the set of all simple closed paths in X that have length 4. For a finite path γ = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m ) let the discrete path integral of π along γ be defined as
Theorem 2.2 (Monderer and Shapley) Let G = (N, X, π) be a finite strategic game. Then, G is an exact potential game if and only if I (γ, π) = 0 for all γ ∈ (X).
In the following, we will use this characterization in order to study the existence of potentials in weighted congestion games.
Weighted Congestion Games
called a congestion model, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a non-empty, finite set of players, F is a non-empty, finite set of facilities, for each player i ∈ N , her collection of pure strategies X i is a non-empty, finite set of subsets of F and (c f ) f ∈F is a set of cost functions.
In the following, we will define weighted congestion games similar to Goemans et al. [17] .
Definition 3.2 (Weighted congestion game) Let
>0 be a vector of demands. The corresponding weighted congestion game is the strategic game
We call f (x) the load on facility f in strategy x. In case there is no confusion on the underlying congestion model, we will write G instead of G(M).
A slightly different class of games has been considered by (among others) Fotakis et al. [14, 15] , Gairing et al. [16] and Mavronicolas et al. [22] . They considered games that almost coincide with Definition 3.2 except that the private cost of every player is not scaled by her demands. We call such games normalized if they comply with Definition 3.2 except that the private costs are defined asπ i (
Fotakis et al. [14] show that there are normalized weighted congestion games with c f ( ) = for all f ∈ F that are not exact potential games. They also show that any normalized weighted congestion game with linear costs on the facilities admits a wpotential.
We state the following trivial relations between weighted congestion games and normalized weighted congestion games: Let G = (N, X, π) andḠ = (N, X,π) be a weighted congestion game and a normalized weighted congestion game with demands (d i ) i∈N , respectively. Moreover, let them share the same congestion model and the same demands. Then G andḠ coincide in the following sense: (i) A strategy profile x ∈ X is a PNE in G if and only if x is a PNE inḠ; (ii) A real-valued function P : X → R is a (w i /d i ) i∈N -potential for G if and only if P is a (w i ) i∈N -potential forḠ; (iii) A real-valued function P : X → R is an ordinal potential for G (see [25] for a definition) if and only if P is an ordinal potential forḠ; (iv) The real-valued function P : X → R is an exact potential for G if and only if P is a (d i ) i∈N -potential forḠ; (v) The real-valued function P : X → R is an exact potential forḠ if and only if P is a (1/d i ) i∈N -potential for G. All proofs rely on the simple observation that
Characterizing the Existence of an Exact Potential
In the following, we will examine necessary and sufficient conditions for a weighted congestion game G to be a potential game. The criterion in Theorem 2.2 states that the existence of an exact potential for G = (N, X, π) is equivalent to the fact that I (γ, π) = 0 for all γ ∈ (X). In such paths, either one or two players deviate. It is easy to verify that I (γ, π) = 0 for all paths γ with only one deviating player. Considering a path γ with two deviating players, say i and j , each of them uses two different strategies, say x i , y i ∈ X i and x j , y j ∈ X j . We denote by z −{i,j } ∈ X −{i,j } the strategy profile of all players except i and j that remains constant in γ . Then, a generic path γ ∈ (X) can be written as
For a facility f ∈ F , we define r f = k∈N \{i,j }:f ∈(z −{i,j } ) m d m as the sum of the demands on f in the partial strategy profile z −{i,j } . The following lemma provides an explicit formula for the calculation of I (γ, π) for such a path.
Lemma 3.3 Let M = (N, F, X, (c f ) f ∈F ) be a congestion model and G(M) a corresponding weighted congestion game with demands
be an arbitrary path in (X) with two deviating players. Then, 
where
and
Proof We fix i, j ∈ N, x i , y i ∈ X i , x j , y j ∈ X j , and z −{i,j } ∈ X −{i,j } arbitrarily and consider the path
. We compute straightforwardly that
For fixed x i , y i , x j and y j , every facility f ∈ F can be chosen by player i in both strategy x i and strategy y i , in one of these strategies or not at all. The same holds for player j and strategies x j and y j . We can thus decompose F into 16 disjoint sets F 1 , . . . , F 16 . The first set, F 1 , comprises all facilities that are in (x i \ y i ) ∩ (x j \ y j ). F 2 contains all facilities that are in (x i \ y i ) ∩ (x j ∩ y j ), and so on. The comprehensive description of all 16 cases is given in Table 1 . In order to compute for instance the first term of (2), we notice that in strategy profile x = (y i , x j , z −{i,j } ) the load on each facility f ∈ F 5 ∪ F 6 ∪ F 9 ∪ F 10 equals
These considerations lead to the following equation. We will use the notation F,G for f ∈F ∪G .
By reordering the summation many terms cancel out and we obtain
establishing the result.
Using Lemma 3.3, we can derive a sufficient condition on the existence of an exact potential in a weighted congestion game. 
Proof Using the criterion of Monderer and Shapley, it is enough to prove that I (γ, π) = 0 for all γ ∈ (X). By Lemma 3.3, I (γ, π) evaluates to
for some i, j ∈ N f and r f ∈ R f −{i,j } . Using (3) each summand of (4) equals 0, establishing the result.
It follows easily that the above condition is satisfied if all demands are equal (this corresponds to unweighted congestion games, see Rosenthal's potential [28] ).
For different demands d i = d j it is a useful observation that we can write the condition of Proposition 3.4 as [14] .
For a single weighted congestion game, the linearity condition on cost functions, however, is only sufficient but not necessary. In Example 3.5, we show that it is possible to construct a non-affine cost function that satisfies the condition of Proposition 3.4 for all 3 player games with demand vector (1, 2, 5) .
be an arbitrary congestion model with three players and let G(M) be a corresponding weighted congestion game with demands
We want to construct a non-linear cost function that gives rise to an exact potential in G. To this end, we consider an arbitrary 4-cycle γ . We apply Lemma 3.3 and obtain that I (γ, π) evaluates to 
(1, 5, 2), (2, 5, 1).
Note that only realizations with d i < d j are considered, the others are symmetric and, thus, omitted. Proposition 3.4 establishes that it is sufficient for the existence of an exact potential that in each cost function c f , the values to the arguments shown in (7) lie on a straight line. It is easy to construct a non-linear cost function c : R >0 → R satisfying this property. An example of such a function is given in Fig. 1 . We derive that I (γ, π) = 0 for any 4-cycle γ in any such game regardless of the structure of the set of strategies. There is, however, an important question left: Are there non-affine cost functions that give rise to an exact potential in all weighted congestion games, i.e., in weighted congestion games with arbitrary strategy spaces and number of players, respectively? Under mild assumptions on feasible cost functions, we will give in Theorem 3.7 a negative answer to this question. First, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 Let C be a set of functions and let G(C) be the set of all weighted congestion games with cost functions in C. Every G ∈ G(C) has an exact potential if and only if for all
for all x, y ∈ R >0 and z ∈ R ≥0 .
Proof Suppose G = (N, X, π) ∈ G(C) is a weighted congestion game with cost functions in C and every c ∈ C satisfies (8). First, we will show that G has an exact potential. To this end, let γ ∈ (X) be an arbitrary simple closed path in X of length 4.
I (γ, π) evaluates to (1), which is zero using (8).
For the opposite direction suppose that there is ac ∈ C that does not satisfy equation (8) . This implies that there are x, y ∈ R >0 and z ∈ R ≥0 such that We will now solve the functional equation (8) in order to characterize all cost functions that guarantee an exact potential in all weighted congestion games. We require the following property: A function c : R >0 → R is locally bounded, if for every compact set K ⊂ R >0 , |c(x)| < M K for all x ∈ K and a constant M K ∈ R >0 potentially depending on K.
Theorem 3.7 Let C be a set of locally bounded functions and let G(C) be the set of weighted congestion games with cost functions in C. Then, every G ∈ G(C) admits an exact potential function if and only if C contains affine functions only, that is, every c ∈ C can be written as c( ) = a c + b c for some a c , b c ∈ R.
Proof Fotakis et al. [14] derived an exact potential function for weighted congestion games with affine cost functions. We can provide an alternative non-constructive proof by checking that affine functions fulfill functional equation (8) and, thus, we may conclude that they give rise to an exact potential. We will prove the reverse direction in two steps.
In
Step 1, we prove the following: Let c fulfill (8) . Then, c is differentiable and
First, we will show continuity of c on R >0 . Let x ∈ R >0 and z ∈ R ≥0 be arbitrary and let (y n ) n∈N be a sequence in R >0 such that y n n→∞ −→ 0 and both y n + z > 0 and y n + x > 0 for all n ∈ N. Then, using (8) 
Characterizing the Existence of a w-Potential
Our next goal is to determine whether weaker notions of potential functions will enrich the class of cost functions giving rise to a potential game. The idea of a wpotential allows a player specific scaling of the private cost π i by a strictly positive w i . It is a useful observation that the existence of a w-potential function is equivalent to the existence of a strictly positive-valued vector w = (w i ) i∈N such that the game G w with private costsπ = × i∈N π i /w i has an exact potential.
Using this equivalent formulation and Theorem 2.2 it follows that the existence of an exact potential function for the game G w = (N, X,π) is equivalent to I (γ,π) = 0 for all γ ∈ (X) suggesting that G w has an exact potential if and only if there are w i , w j ∈ R >0 such that
for all i, j ∈ N and all r f ∈ R f −{i,j } . In particular it is necessary that either c f (
is strictly positive and independent of both f and r f . This observation leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8 Let C be a set of functions. Let G(C) be the set of weighted congestion games with cost functions in C. Every G ∈ G(C) has a w-potential if and only if for all x, y ∈ R >0
, there exists an α(x, y) ∈ R >0 such that
for all z ∈ R ≥0 and c ∈ C.
Proof Let M = (N, F, X, (c f ) f ∈F ) be a congestion model where for all f ∈ F the cost function c f satisfies (10). Let (d i ) i∈N , d i ∈ R >0 , be an arbitrary vector of demands and G(M) the corresponding weighted congestion game. We will show that this game possesses a w-potential. Lemma 3.8 implies that there for any two distinct
In both cases, we can chose the values of α(
. In particular, we can find a vector of weights (w i ) i∈N ∈ R >0 such that α(d i , d j ) = w i /w j for all i, j ∈ N with i = j . Using Monderer and Shapley's criterion we will show that the corresponding game G w = (N, X,π) has an exact potential. For this, we consider an arbitrary path γ ∈ (X). Without loss of generality only two players, say i and j , change their strategies in γ while the sum of the demands of all other players is equal to a facilityspecific value r f . Analogously to the proof of Lemma 3.6, we get
We multiply with w i , use α(d i , d j ) = w i /w j and obtain
Using (11) 
The second equality follows from the assumption c α (x 0 + y 0 + z α ) = c α (y 0 + z α ) and the contradiction follows from c α (
Using the criterion of Monderer and Shapley the game does not admit a weighted potential and we thus may assume in the following that c α (
Let α be arbitrary and consider c α ∈ C and z α ∈ R ≥0 such that (12) does not hold. As we may assume that c α (
is well defined. If β < 0, it follows that I (γ, π / w) = 0 for any strictly positive vector w. If β > 0, we find c β ∈ C and z β such that
Finally, let us consider the congestion model
Assuming that G admits a weighted potential we can find a strictly positive vector w such that G w admits an exact potential. To this end, we will apply the criterion of Monderer and Shapley to the paths
({f }, {g}, {h}, {ι}) , and compute that
We derive from (13) and (14) that
which is a contradiction.
Although condition (10) seems to be similar to the functional equation (8) characterizing the existence of an exact potential, it is not possible to proceed using differential equations. As α(x, y) need not be bounded it is not possible to prove continuity and differentiability of c. Instead, we will use the discrete counterpart of differential equations, that is, difference equations. Proof First, we will prove that these functions guarantee the existence of a wpotential in all such games. We have shown in Sect. 3.1 that affine cost functions c f give rise to an exact potential. As every exact potential function is also a w-potential for w = (1, . . . , 1), we may conclude that affine cost functions give rise to a weighted potential in weighted congestion games. So let us check the case c( ) = a c e φ + b c for φ = 0. It is easy to verify that
Note in particular that α(x, y) does neither depend on a c , b c , nor z. Thus, it is unambiguously defined and strictly positive. Theorem 3.8 then yields the result. To show the opposite direction, we assume that the conditions on C do not hold but that every G ∈ G(C) admits a w-potential.
First, suppose that there is a functionc ∈ C that is neither affine nor exponential. This implies that there are four points p 1 < p 2 < p 3 < p 4 following neither an exponential nor a affine law, that is, there are neither a, b and φ ∈ R such that
nor are there s and t ∈ R such that
Asc is continuous, we may assume without loss of generality that the above conditions hold for rational p 1 , . . . , p 4 and we can write them as
We regard a congestion model M = (N = {1, 2, 3}, F, X, c) and a series of games G m (M) = (N, X, π), 0 ≤ m ≤ 2m 4 . We set the demands of the players as
. By assumption each game G m admits a w-potential. By Lemma 3.8 this implies that for each game
.
is the same for each game G m . Now, we introduce f n = c(n/(2k)) and consider the sequence (f n ) n∈N . Thus, we can write
, we conclude thatc is constant, which contradicts our assumption. So we may assume that α(d 1 , d 2 ) = 1/2 and we obtain
Equation (15) The characteristic equation of the recurrence relation (15) equals d 2 ) = 1, two different roots occur and f m can be computed explicitly and uniquely for even m as
for some constants s, t ∈ R showing thatc follows either an exponential or affine law on p 1 , . . . , p 4 . So it remains to show that neither affine and exponential functions nor exponential function with different exponents can occur simultaneously. Let us first assume on the contrary that C contains both affine and exponential functions, that is, there arec 1 ,c 2 ∈ C such thatc 1 ( ) = s + t for some constants s, t ∈ R andc 2 = ae φ + b for some constants a, b ∈ R and φ = 0. Let us fix x = 1 and y = 2. We calculate that
while
Thus, α(1, 2) is not independent ofc 1 andc 2 , respectively, which contradicts Theorem 3.8.
To finish the proof, let us finally assume that C contains two exponential functions with different exponentsc 2 ,c 3 ∈ C wherec 2 = ae φ + bc 3 ( ) = se ψ + t for some constants a, b, s, t ∈ R and 0 = ψ = φ = 0. As in (17), we obtain, α 2 (1, 2) = (1 + e −φ )/2 and α 3 (1, 2) = (1 + e −ψ )/2. Using that the exponential function is bijective, we derive α 2 (1, 2) = α 3 (1, 2) for φ = ψ , which is a contradiction to the conditions of Lemma 3.8.
Panagopoulou and Spirakis [27] showed that the function P : X → R defined as 
Implications of Our Characterizations
It is natural to ask whether these results remain valid if additional restrictions on the set G(C) are made. A natural restriction is to assume that all players have an integral demand. As we used infinitesimally small demands in the proof of Lemma 3.6, our results for exact potentials do not apply directly to integer demands. With a slight variation of the proof of Theorem 3.9, where only the case α(·, ·) = 1 is considered, however, we still obtain the same result provided C contains only continuous functions.
Another natural restriction on G(C) are games with symmetric sets of strategies or games with a bounded number of players or facilities. Since the proofs of Lemmas 3.6 and 3.8 and Theorems 3.7 and 3.9 rely on mild assumptions, we can strengthen our characterizations as follows. We remark that the conditions given in Corollary 3.10 are not necessary for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential function, see Monderer and Shapley [25] for a definition. In fact, for singleton congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions, there exists a generalized ordinal potential function, see Fotakis et al. [13] .
In each game
Yet, we are able to deduce an interesting result concerning the existence of wpotentials in weighted congestion games, where each facility can be chosen by at most two players. By adapting the proof of Lemma 3.8 for two-player games, the following lemma follows. 
for all c ∈ C.
Using this lemma, we can prove that in games where each facility lies in the strategy sets of at most two players also non-affine and non-exponential functions give rise to a weighted potential. This result generalizes a result of Anshelevich et al. in [3] , who showed that a weighted congestion game with two players and c f ( ) = b f / for a constant b f ∈ R >0 has a potential. Moreover, this result shows that the characterization of Corollary 3.10 is tight in the sense that weighted congestion games with two players admit a w-potential even if cost functions are neither affine nor exponential.
Extensions of the Model
In the last section, we developed a new technique to characterize the set of functions that give rise to a potential in weighted congestion games. In this section, we will introduce two generalizations of weighted congestion games and investigate the set of cost functions that assure the existence of potential functions. 
Restricting the strategy sets to singletons, we obtain scheduling games. In a scheduling game, players are jobs that have machine-dependent demands and can be scheduled on a set of admissible machines (restricted scheduling on unrelated machines). In contrast to the classical approach, where each job strives to minimize its makespan, we consider a different private cost function: Machines charge a price per unit given by a load-dependent cost function c f and each job minimizes its cost defined as the price of the chosen machine multiplied with its machine-dependent demand. Proof For any set of functions C, the set G(C) of weighted congestion games with cost functions in C is contained in the set of weighted congestion games with facilitydependent demands. Thus, we can restrict C to the set of affine functions or exponential functions as in Theorem 3.9.
We first show that if C contains an exponential function, then there is a weighted congestion game with facility-dependent demands that does not admit a weighted potential. To this end, suppose that there is a cost functionc ∈ C that can be written be an arbitrary weighted congestion game with facility-dependent demands and let x, y ∈ X be two strategy profiles such that x = (x k , x −k ) and y = (y k , y −k ) with x −k = y −k for some x k , y k ∈ X k and x −k ∈ X −k . We notice that P i (x) = P i (y) for all i < k. Now consider a player i > k. When computing P i (x) − P i (y), we observe that all costs corresponding to facilities not contained in x k ∪ y k cancel out. For each facility f ∈ (x i ∩ x k ) \ y k , we get c In our definition of weighted congestion games with elastic demands, we explicitly allow for positive and negative, and for increasing and decreasing cost functions. Thus, an increase in the demand may increase or decrease the player's private cost. Note that in weighted congestion games with elastic demands, the strategy sets are topological spaces and are in general infinite. By restricting the sets D i to singletons D i = {d i }, i ∈ N , we obtain weighted congestion games as a special case of weighted congestion games with elastic demands. The proof of the following result is omitted as it is similar to the case of facility-dependent demands. As an immediate consequence, we obtain the existence of a PNE if cost functions are affine. Note that the existence of a potential is not sufficient for proving existence of a PNE as we are considering infinite games. However, asX is compact and P is continuous, P has a minimumx * ∈X andx * is a PNE.
